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S E C R E T STATE 119331

SIPDIS, GENEVA FOR JCIC

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TAGS: [KACT](#) [PARM](#) [START](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [KZ](#) [UP](#) [BO](#)
SUBJECT: SFO-VII GUIDANCE-003: STREAMLINED PACKAGE ON
MOBILE MISSILES

REF: A. GENEVA 0968 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-007)
[1](#)B. GENEVA 1015 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-010)
[1](#)C. GENEVA 1016 (SFO-GVA-VI: RFG-011)
[1](#)D. STATE 98566 (SFO-V GUIDANCE-004)
[1](#)E. STATE 106618 (SFO-VI GUIDANCE-002)

Classified By: Karin L. Look, Acting Assistant Secretary,
VCI.
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

Streamlined Package on Mobile Missiles

[1](#)1. (S) Background: The United States believes the START Follow-on treaty must continue to recognize the inherent difficulty of monitoring mobile ICBMs by including some verification provisions and operational restrictions that apply only to mobile ICBMs, but that the number and type of such unique verification provisions and operational restrictions can be reduced to the minimum needed for effective monitoring. In its current SFO position, the United States has proposed that, in addition to the verification provisions that apply to all missiles in the treaty, the treaty contain the following measures that are unique to mobile ICBMs:

- a. A limit on the total number of non-deployed mobile ICBMs (80) and on non-deployed launchers for ICBMs (80) commensurate with the number of non-deployed systems Russia had during START Treaty implementation;
- b. A limit on the number of non-deployed mobile missiles (2) and non-deployed launchers (2) of each type covered By the treaty at the maintenance facility associated with operating bases for mobile missiles;
- c. Special procedures for the elimination of mobile ICBMs and their canisters and launchers;
- d. Cooperative measures for deployed mobile ICBMs;
- e. Placement of a unique identifier on each mobile ICBM to assist in monitoring the total mobile ICBM inventory; and
- f. Advance notice of the exit of a new mobile ICBM from its production facility, along with a remotely monitored camera at the exit of the production facility to observe the exit of missiles from the facility.

[1](#)2. (S) Guidance: To address strong Russian resistance

To the U.S. proposed approach to mobile missile monitoring, and taking into account Delegation requests for guidance (Refs A, B and C), Washington has developed a more streamlined approach which seeks to respond to Russia's concern regarding what it perceives to be the asymmetric nature of the U.S.-proposed verification provisions, while still providing effective verification of Russian mobile missiles under the treaty. This streamlined approach would further modify the current U.S. proposal as follows:

a. Unique Identifier: The United States continues to believe that, in order to assist in monitoring the total number of mobile ICBMs produced, and tracking the individual missiles throughout their life cycles, each mobile ICBM and its launch canister should be marked with a "unique identifier" (UID). The United States remains willing, as offered in Ref D, to permit the use of the unique tail number on each U.S. and Russian heavy bomber as a UID for heavy bombers.

b. Production Notification: In lieu of continuous monitoring at production facilities for mobile ICBMs, the United States has previously proposed (ref D) that the Russian Federation notify the United States, 60 hours before the exit of a mobile ICBM from the Votkinsk final assembly plant, of the impending exit of a mobile ICBM and provide the appropriate missile UID. If this advance notification requirement can be agreed, the United States is prepared to drop its proposal for the placement of a camera for remote monitoring at that facility. The United States remains willing to offer reciprocal Notifications of exits of missiles from an analogous U.S. missile production facility.

c. Observation of the Final Cuts for Eliminations
(Response to Refs B and C):

The United States proposes that for all ICBMs and SLBMs, only the elimination of the first stage, as well as the associated launch canister if so equipped, is required for the elimination of the missile. U.S. acceptance of this requirement is predicated on inspectors having the right to observe the final cuts of the motor casing for the first stage of a mobile ICBM and of the launch canister for that ICBM.

The United States could agree to a modified procedure for elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs that would shorten inspection time and facilitate Russia's use of the remaining vehicle for purposes not inconsistent with the treaty as follows: Inspectors would have the right to observe the final step of the elimination process, i.e., cutting off the mountings of the erector-launcher mechanism (the front leveling jacks would remain intact, but 0.78 meters of the chassis would be cut off). Washington does not believe it necessary to include data on eliminated launchers in the MOU, or to inspect such launchers after they have been eliminated in this manner. The United States could agree to this elimination procedure if Russia will provide assurances that it will not permit the transfer of such eliminated launchers to parties outside of Russia.

13. (S) Head of Delegation may draw on the following points in presenting the streamlined position outlined in para 2 above:

-- The United States continues to maintain that special verification measures are needed to address the unique difficulties associated with monitoring mobile missiles. To address Russian concerns, we propose to keep unique provisions to a minimum. Accordingly, we have further simplified proposed provisions affecting mobile ICBMs and mobile ICBM launchers while maintaining what we view to be the minimum necessary for verification. These further modifications to the U.S. position include:

a. With respect to the monitoring of mobile missile production, we could accept having only a provision requiring notification 60 hours before the exit of a mobile ICBM from the mobile missile final assembly plant, and remain willing to offer reciprocal notifications of U.S. missile exits.

b. We have removed the requirement that the second and third stages of the mobile ICBM be eliminated, and removed the requirements for inspectors to observe the entire elimination process for mobile ICBMs.

c. We have developed a modified procedure for elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs to reduce inspection time and facilitate use of the eliminated launchers for purposes not inconsistent with the treaty, so long as Russia agrees not to permit their transfer to parties outside of Russia.

End Guidance.
CLINTON